How can event organisers and venue operators protect people from vehicle-borne threats?
Understanding how these threats can develop is an important starting point for effective Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM).
According to the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), vehicle-borne threats range from relatively simple attacks to more sophisticated, coordinated activity.
There are three main types of vehicle-borne threat:
- Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW)
The deliberate use of a vehicle to strike pedestrians, crowds, buildings or infrastructure. This may involve a car, van, lorry or other vehicle and can occur with little warning.
- Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)
A vehicle used to transport or contain an explosive device, potentially causing harm through blast effects, fragmentation and associated damage.
- Vehicle as an Enabler (Layered Attack)
A vehicle used to transport attackers, weapons or other equipment to facilitate an attack. This may form part of a wider incident involving multiple attack methods.
Seven Ways Vehicle-Borne Threats Can Manifest and How to Mitigate Them
The NPSA identifies seven principal methods. Each presents different challenges, requiring a combination of appropriate physical protection, trained personnel and clear security procedures.
- Parked
A vehicle is positioned near or within a location, potentially to facilitate an attack.
Staff and stewards should be trained to recognise and report suspicious vehicles, including those parked unexpectedly or left unattended in unusual circumstances.
Clear parking restrictions, vehicle monitoring and established reporting procedures can help identify concerns early. Any suspicious vehicle should be reported through the agreed security process, without staff approaching or investigating it themselves.
- Encroachment
A vehicle gains unauthorised access to an area intended to be protected.
Effective vehicle access control relies on trained personnel following agreed procedures consistently.
Staff should know how to verify vehicle authorisation and who to contact when access is uncertain. A driver appearing legitimate, or claiming an urgent reason to enter, should not bypass the agreed checks.
Where necessary, physical HVM measures can support these procedures by restricting unauthorised vehicle movement.
- Penetrative
A vehicle is deliberately driven against physical security measures or infrastructure.
This is where impact-tested Hostile Vehicle Mitigation barriers can provide physical protection.
Products such as Armis ONE, Husson H-Stop and ARX Stopper! have been independently impact-tested against defined vehicle types and speeds.
Their performance differs, including how far a vehicle may travel beyond the barrier following impact. The appropriate solution depends on the assessed threat and the protection required.
- Deception
A vehicle or its occupants appear legitimate to obtain access under false pretences.
A vehicle may appear to belong to a recognised contractor, delivery company or emergency service.
For example, an emergency vehicle could be stolen and used to impersonate a legitimate responder.
Security teams should have agreed arrangements for verifying unexpected access requests, including emergency access, without unnecessarily delaying genuine responders.
Staff training and clear communication with the event control team are essential.
- Duress or Coercion
An individual is threatened or pressured into facilitating vehicle access.
Security personnel or authorised drivers could be pressured into granting access against established procedures.
Training should help staff recognise coercion, understand how to raise concerns discreetly and know how to summon appropriate assistance.
Clear reporting arrangements and management support help protect employees while maintaining security.
- Insider
Someone with legitimate access knowingly assists hostile activity.
Appropriate recruitment checks, contractor verification and role-based access permissions can reduce this risk.
Organisers should also review who can authorise vehicle movements, operate protective equipment or change security arrangements.
Access permissions should be reviewed when responsibilities change, supported by a workplace culture where staff feel confident reporting concerns.
- Tamper or Sabotage
Protective systems or security arrangements are deliberately compromised.
HVM systems differ in their resistance to tampering and their supervision requirements.
Moveable solutions such as Husson H-Stop may require operational supervision to maintain their intended configuration.
Other systems incorporate additional resistance to unauthorised interference. For example, Armis ONE has undergone manipulation testing, while The Claw is designed to be tamper-resistant.
Regular inspections, suitable maintenance and clear responsibility for checking equipment help ensure protective measures remain effective.
Protecting People Through Better Planning
Understanding these seven methods helps organisers identify where their existing arrangements may need strengthening.
Some risks can be reduced through staff training, access controls and communication. Others may require certified physical HVM measures alongside those procedures.
At Crowdguard, our Plan – Provide – Protect methodology brings these elements together, helping venues, local authorities and event organisers make informed decisions based on their unique circumstances.
The priority is always protecting people while keeping public spaces accessible, welcoming and functioning as intended.
Need help understanding vehicle-borne threats at your event or venue? Email info@crowdguard.co.uk for practical advice on HVM and protective security.